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Another One Bites the Dust! 
Bolstered Law Offices and a  
Blocked Taxman in Chambre des 
notaires du Québec 
Amy Salyzyn 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec the 
Supreme Court once again vigorously defended a lawyer’s obligation to 
preserve confidential client information.1 The Court’s recent interest in 
solicitor-client privilege is significant. Since 2006, the Court has heard at 
least 10 cases dealing with solicitor-client privilege, about the same number 
it heard during that period related to each of sections 15 and 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).2 The Court’s 
language in these cases reinforces the perception that the Court views 
solicitor-client privilege as extraordinarily important. Among other things, 
the Court has described solicitor-client privilege as “one of the most ancient 
                                                                                                                       
 Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. An earlier draft of this article was presented to  
the 20th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School on April 7, 2017. 
The Author thanks the attendees of this conference for their helpful feedback as well as Vanessa 
MacDonnell and Alice Woolley for their thoughtful suggestions.  
1 Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2016] S.C.J. No. 20, 
2016 SCC 20, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 336 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chambre des notaires”]. 
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11. In his leading text on solicitor-client privilege in Canada, Adam Dodek observes “[b]etween 1999-
2013, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered no less than thirteen decisions in cases directly involving 
the privilege” (A. Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2014), at 15 
[hereinafter “Dodek”]). The statistic used in this article uses the cases cited by Professor Dodek between 
2002-2013 and adds the additional cases that have been rendered since 2013: Chambre des notaires, id.; 
Canada (National Revenue) v. Thompson, [2016] S.C.J. No. 21, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 381, 2016 SCC 21 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thompson”]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. University of 
Calgary, [2016] S.C.J. No. 53, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 555, 2016 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “University of 
Calgary”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7, 
2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) varg Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] 
B.C.J. No. 632 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Federation of Law Societies”].  
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and powerful privileges known to our jurisprudence” and as having an 
“importance…to our justice system [that] cannot be overstated.”3  
One major preoccupation in the Court’s recent decisions on solicitor-
client privilege has been the question of when and how the government 
may statutorily interfere with the privilege. The Court provides strong 
protection for privileged material, precluding any statutory interference 
unless expressly authorized.4 It further prohibits any exercise of statutory 
authority that might interfere with solicitor-client privilege unless 
“absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling 
legislation.”5 An additional layer of protection for privileged material 
now exists as a result of the Court’s “constitutionalization” of solicitor-
client privilege in the early 2000s. The Court classifies the privilege as a 
principle of fundamental justice and recognizes that a client has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy of “the highest order” in relation to 
documents protected by solicitor-client privilege for the purposes of 
sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, respectively.6  
In Chambre des notaires, the constitutional implications of solicitor-client 
privilege were again squarely before the Court. The case dealt with the 
constitutionality of a regime under the Income Tax Act that required legal 
professionals, upon request, to send client documents and information to tax 
authorities. The regime also declared that solicitor-client privilege did not 
cover lawyers’ accounting records notwithstanding the fact that such records 
might otherwise be considered privileged at common law. The regulatory 
body for notaries in Quebec, the Chambre des notaires, challenged the law 
under both sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, although, as discussed below, the 
Court held that consideration of section 7 was unnecessary after finding a 
violation of section 8 that could not be justified under section 1. 
                                                                                                                       
3 The first quotation is from R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, at para. 39 (S.C.C.), 
and inspiration for its inclusion here comes from Adam Dodek’s highlighting of this phrasing in 
Dodek, id. The second quotation is from University of Calgary, id., at para. 26. 
4 Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, [2008] S.C.J. No. 45, 
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 574 (S.C.C.) and University of Calgary, supra, note 2.  
5 Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.); Goodis v. 
Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 31, 2006 SCC 31 (S.C.C.); University 
of Calgary, id. 
6 The two cases establishing these statuses are R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 
1 S.C.R. 445, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) (section 7) and Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada 
(Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 61, 2002 SCC 61, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) (section 8) [hereinafter “Lavallee, Rackel & 
Heintz”]. For commentary discussing the “constitutionalization” of solicitor-client privilege, see M. 
Jamal & B. Morgan, “The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 213 and A. Dodek, “Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2010), 35 Queen’s L.J. 493-538. 
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At one level, not much is new in Chambre des notaires. The Court’s 
treatment of solicitor-client privilege under section 8 is largely 
consistent with its previous jurisprudence. The decision, however, is 
still worthy of extended analysis. The Court’s reasons crystallize the 
tension resulting from its characterization of solicitor-client privilege 
as a substantive rule not to be interfered with unless “absolutely 
necessary” and its parallel efforts to constitutionalize the status of this 
rule under a Charter right that allows for “reasonable” searches and 
seizures. Considered together with last year’s ruling in Federation of 
Law Societies,7 this decision confirms that the Court’s recent attempts 
to insulate the lawyer-client relationship from government interference 
by using individual Charter rights results in some awkward jurisprudential 
gymnastics. More broadly, Chambre des notaires demonstrates that to 
evaluate governmental attempts to legislate in relation to the lawyer-client 
relationship requires assessing the principle of lawyer independence. 
Consequently, it pushes us to adopt a clearer understanding of what 
“independence” means than currently exists in the case law, particularly 
for constitutional purposes.8  
II. BACKGROUND 
The facts of Chambre des notaires are straightforward. At issue was a 
procedure (commonly referred to as the “requirement procedure”) in the 
Income Tax Act (“ITA”) whereby tax authorities can require that a person 
send them any information or document for any purposes related to the 
administration or enforcement of the Act.9 A failure to comply with a 
notice received under this procedure can result in a fine of up to $25,000 
and imprisonment of up to 12 months.10 
                                                                                                                       
7 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra, note 2. 
8 Indeed, a number of commentators, including myself and Alice Woolley, have recently 
argued this in relation to the Court’s prior jurisprudence dealing with government regulation of 
lawyers. See, for example, A. Woolley, “Lawyers and the Rule of Law: Interdependence of the Bar, 
the Canadian Constitution and the Law Governing Lawyers” (2015) 34 NJCL 49-74 [hereinafter 
“Woolley, ‘Lawyers and the Rule of Law”]; A. Woolley, “Fundamental Justice (Sort of Maybe) 
Requires a Lawyer’s Commitment to a Client’s Cause” (2015) 34 NJCL 211-214 [hereinafter 
“Woolley, ‘Fundamental Justice”]; A. Salyzyn, “A False Start in Constitutionalizing Lawyer Loyalty 
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
169 [hereinafter “Salyzyn, ‘A False Start’”]. 
9 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 231.2(1). 
10 Id., s. 238(1). 
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The constitutionality of a previous, substantially similar, version of the 
requirement procedure was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1990 case 
of R. v. McKinlay Transport,11 in relation to its application to taxpayers. The 
current case arose because, beginning in 2002, notaries practising law in 
Quebec started to receive notices under the requirement procedure 
demanding information or documents related to their clients.12 Not 
surprisingly, this generated concerns from notaries about breaching their 
clients’ rights to professional secrecy. Ultimately, the regulatory body 
governing notaries — the Chambre des notaries du Quebec — brought a 
declaratory action seeking to have the procedure, as it applied to notaries, 
declared unconstitutional. The Chambre also requested that 17 classes of 
documents that notaries commonly possess or prepare — including, for 
example, marriage contracts and wills — be declared prima facie 
privileged. The Barreau du Quebec joined the proceeding for the purposes 
of having the requested declaration apply also to the lawyers that it licenses. 
Although this case arose because of events in Quebec, tax authorities 
had begun to issue requirement notices of this type to lawyers across 
Canada.13 The fact that Chambre des notaires began in Quebec is 
nonetheless consequential because, technically speaking, the decision 
deals with the constitutional implications of the civil law doctrine of 
“professional secrecy”, understood to be “enshrined in Quebec’s Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms”,14 rather than the common law doctrine 
of solicitor-client privilege.15 To the extent that there are distinctions in 
these doctrines — particularly in relation to their sources — such 
distinctions do not materially impact the Court’s discussion in this case 
and its impact on the law going forward. Writing for the Court in 
Chambres des notaires, Wagner and Gascon JJ. note that, “we are of the 
view that there are strong similarities between the common law’s 
                                                                                                                       
11 [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.). 
12 Mémoire des Appelants, Procureur général du Canada et Agence du revenu du  
Canada, at para. 6.  
13 See, for example, the following cases in which the Federal Court considered whether 
client-related documents requested from a lawyer under the requirement procedure were privileged: 
Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Jakabfy, [2013] F.C.J. No. 797, 2013 FC 706 (F.C.) 
(Ontario lawyer); Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Singh Lyn Ragonetti Bindal LLP, 
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1907, 2005 FC 1538 (F.C.) (Alberta lawyer); Canada (Minister of National 
Revenue) v. Reddy, [2006] F.C.J. No. 348, 2006 FC 277 (British Columbia lawyer). 
14 Barreau du Quebec, “Professional Secrecy”, online: <http://www.barreau.qc.ca/en/public/ 
relation/secret/>. 
15 For a helpful discussion of the doctrine of professional secrecy in relation to solicitor-
client privilege, see Dodek, supra, note 2, at 85. 
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solicitor-client privilege and professional secrecy in the civil law.”16 
Indeed, the justices’ reasons treat the doctrines as inter-changeable.17  
Three specific provisions of the ITA were at issue in the proceedings. 
The first provision, section 231.2(1), enables tax authorities to send a 
demand to any person requiring that they send them any information or any 
document.18 The one major constraint in this section is that the demand 
must be for a purpose “[relating] to the administration or enforcement” of 
the ITA.19 The second provision, section 231.7, sets out a procedure to 
allow the Minister of National Revenue to obtain a court order in a  
case where a person does not comply with a demand sent pursuant to  
section 231.2(1).20 In order to make such an order, the judge must be 
satisfied both that the person at issue in fact did not comply and that the 
documents or information at issue are not protected by solicitor-client 
privilege.21 In considering whether privilege applies, the judge is directed to 
apply the definition of solicitor-client privilege as found in the ITA.22 
                                                                                                                       
16 Chambre des notaires, supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
17 For example, in the opening paragraphs of decision, the justices state that “the professional 
secrecy of notaries and lawyers” is “otherwise known as solicitor-client privilege” (Id., at para. 2). 
18 Supra, note 9. This provision reads in full as follows: 
Requirement to provide documents or information 
231.2 (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Minister may, subject to 
subsection (2), for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act 
(including the collection of any amount payable under this Act by any person), of a listed 
international agreement or, for greater certainty, of a tax treaty with another country, by 
notice served personally or by registered or certified mail, require that any person 
provide, within such reasonable time as is stipulated in the notice, 
(a) any information or additional information, including a return of income or a 
supplementary return; or 
(b) any document. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. This provision reads in part: 
231.7 (1) On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding 
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance, information or 
document sought by the Minister under section 231.1 or 231.2 if the judge is satisfied that 
(a) the person was required under section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access, assistance, 
information or document and did not do so; and 
(b) in the case of information or a document, the information or document is not protected 
from disclosure by solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning of subsection 232(1)). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. This provision reads in part: 
231.7 (1) On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding 
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance, information or 
document sought by the Minister under section 231.1 or 231.2 if the judge is satisfied that 
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The third provision before the Court, section 232(1), contains the 
relevant definition of solicitor-client privilege, which states: 
solicitor-client privilege means the right, if any, that a person has in a 
superior court in the province where the matter arises to refuse to disclose an 
oral or documentary communication on the ground that the communication 
is one passing between the person and the person’s lawyer in professional 
confidence, except that for the purposes of this section an accounting record 
of a lawyer, including any supporting voucher or cheque, shall be deemed 
not to be such a communication.23 (emphasis added) 
Because legal professionals received no special treatment under this 
regime, the above provisions enabled tax authorities to demand that lawyers 
or notaries send them client information or documents. The regime did not 
require any notice to clients when demands were being made to their legal 
professional. There was also no requirement that documents or information 
requested from a lawyer’s or notary’s office first be vetted for solicitor-
client privilege, either by the legal professional or a judge, before being sent 
to tax authorities. In order for privilege to be claimed, the lawyer or notary 
would have to refuse to comply with a demand and then defend this refusal 
at a subsequent hearing. Additionally, if such a hearing is held, there is the 
possibility that the court will order the disclosure of client information or 
documents that would otherwise be protected by solicitor-client privilege at 
common law because section 232(1) deems all lawyer accounting records 
not to be privileged. At common law, a lawyer’s accounting records are not 
considered to be categorically or necessarily privileged but do, in certain 
cases and circumstances, obtain the protection of solicitor-client privilege. 
Accounting records can, for example, include descriptions about why a 
client retained a lawyer or be organized in such a way that aspects of the 
lawyer’s legal strategy are revealed.24 Whether something in a lawyer’s file 
is privileged depends “not on the type of document it is but, rather, on its 
content and on what it might reveal about the relationship and 
communications between a client and his or her…lawyer.”25 
                                                                                                                       
(a) the person was required under section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access, 
assistance, information or document and did not do so; and 
(b) in the case of information or a document, the information or document is not 
protected from disclosure by solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning of 
subsection 232(1)). 
23 Id., s. 232(1).  
24 Chambre des notaires, supra, note 1, at para. 74.  
25 Id., at para. 73. 
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III. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
At first instance, Blanchard J.C.S. of the Quebec Superior Court held 
that the provisions at issue were unconstitutional and thus of no force or 
effect in relation to notaries and lawyers in Quebec.26 He also granted the 
Chambre’s request that certain classes of documents be declared prima 
facie privileged in relation to the procedure. The Quebec Court of Appeal 
upheld this ruling, except for Blanchard J.C.S.’s declaration that certain 
documents be declared prima facie privileged.27  
Although the Chambre alleged both section 7 and section 8 violations, 
both courts below rested their conclusions on section 8 alone. The same 
was true before the Supreme Court of Canada.28 With respect to section 8, 
the Court dealt with the first question of whether a seizure had taken 
place relatively quickly, noting its previous holding in McKinlay that a 
requirement under section 231(3) constitutes a seizure for the purposes of 
section 8.29 Notwithstanding the dispositive nature of this holding in 
McKinlay, the Court also took pains, in its consideration of this first 
question, to emphasize the significant privacy expectations that attach to 
privileged information. In doing so, the Court noted, among other things, 
professional secrecy’s status as a “fundamental and substantive” rule of 
law with “deep significance” and reiterated the proposition that it 
“should not be interfered with unless absolutely necessary given that it 
must remain as close to absolute as possible”.30  
The Court rejected the submission by the Attorney General and the 
Canada Revenue Agency that the civil and administrative context of the 
requirement procedure diminished a client’s expectation of privacy in 
privileged information and documents.31 On this point, the Court 
concluded, citing its previous jurisprudence, that “...[t]he protection 
afforded to professional secrecy in the context of a s. 8 analysis is 
invariably high regardless of whether the seizure has occurred in a 
criminal or an administrative context.”32  
                                                                                                                       
26 Chambre des notaires du Québec c. Canada (Procureur général), [2010] J.Q. no 8868, 
2010 QCCS 4215 (Que. C.S.). 
27 Canada (Procureur général) c. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2014] J.Q. no 2296, 
2014 QCCA 552 (Que. C.A.). 
28 Chambre des notaires, supra, note 1, at paras. 25-26. 
29 Id., at para. 27. 
30 Id., at para. 28. 
31 Id., at para. 30. 
32 Id., at para. 34. 
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Having found that a seizure took place, the Court then proceeded to 
consider the second question under section 8: whether the seizure was 
unreasonable. The Court first noted that “the usual balancing exercise” 
under section 8, which involves weighing individual privacy interests 
against the state’s interest in the search or seizure, is not “particularly 
helpful” given solicitor-client privilege’s status as “a principle of 
fundamental justice and a legal principle of supreme importance”.33 
Additionally, the Court reiterated its previous jurisprudence instructing 
that “any legislative provision that interferes with professional secrecy 
more than is absolutely necessary will be labelled unreasonable”34 and 
observed “...[a]bsolute necessity is as restrictive a test as may be 
formulated short of an absolute prohibition in every case”.35 
Given the very restrictive test set up by the Court, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the requirement procedure, insofar as it involves 
requests made to legal professionals, was found to give rise to 
unreasonable seizures contrary to section 8.36 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court relied on several constitutional “defects” in the requirement 
procedure that had been identified by the courts below:37 
1. The “client is given no notice of the requirement”. 
2. There is “an “inappropriate burden” placed solely on the notary or 
lawyer concerned” to claim privilege. 
3. It is not “absolutely necessary” to compel disclosure of the 
information being sought. 
4. “[N]o measures have been taken to help mitigate the impairment of 
professional secrecy.” 
Although in prior cases, the Court had emphasized that requiring 
judicial pre-authorization “is, in itself, an important protection against 
improper search and seizure of privileged material” from lawyers’ 
offices, the Court in this case explicitly stated that judicial pre-
authorization is not necessary to render the regime constitutionally 
compliant.38  
                                                                                                                       
33 Id., at paras. 36-37. 
34 Id., at para. 38. 
35 Id.  
36 Id., at para. 38. 
37 Id., at paras. 44-61. 
38 Id., at para. 52. 
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Having found that the requirement procedure gave rise to 
constitutionally intolerable risks that solicitor-client information would 
be either inadvertently or intentionally disclosed without the client’s 
knowledge, the Court proceeded to consider the constitutionality of 
section 231(1)’s definition of solicitor-client privilege. As the Court itself 
observed, this additional analysis was necessary because, even if 
legislative amendments were made to correct the four defects noted 
above, the fact that section 231(1) deemed lawyer accounting records 
non-privileged meant that materials which would otherwise be 
considered privileged at common law could still be disclosed to tax 
authorities under a reformed regime.39 For example, although amending 
the regime to require client notice would provide more protection against 
lawyers either negligently or intentionally disclosing privileged 
information without the client’s knowledge, a different type of risk would 
still remain with the continuing presence of section 231(1): that the 
lawyer (now with notice to the client) would be required to provide the 
tax authorities with materials that would be considered privileged but for 
the idiosyncratic definition of privilege within this regime. 
In considering the constitutionality of this definition, the Court again 
emphasized the importance of privilege and articulated a restrictive 
version of the test of absolute necessity: 
…[A] legislative provision cannot, by abrogating professional secrecy, 
authorize the state to gain access to information that is normally 
protected, where the abrogation is not absolutely necessary to achieve 
the purposes of the legislation. If the provision does so, the seizure will 
be unreasonable and contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. This rule prevents 
the state from giving itself, with a clear intention to create a statutory 
exception to professional secrecy, the authority to gain untrammelled 
access to documents that are normally privileged even though the 
state’s operations are facilitated only minimally by access to the 
information.40 
In applying this test to the definition in section 232(1), the Court 
focused on the “broad and undefined” nature of the accounting 
exception. It did not identify any persuasive arguments for why, in order 
to achieve the purposes of the ITA, it would be absolutely necessary to set 
                                                                                                                       
39 Id., at para. 70. Another important layer to this aspect of the case is the fact that the Court 
released a companion case the same day — Thompson, supra, note 2 — wherein it held that, a matter of 
ordinary statutory interpretation, s. 232(1) constituted a valid exception to solicitor-client privilege. 
40 Id., at para. 81. 
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aside professional secrecy for such a wide range of documents.41 The Court 
also expressed concern about the information obtained through this 
permissive definition being possibly used for collateral purposes, noting 
that “...[t]here appear to be no restrictions on sharing the information with 
government agencies and other public players as long as the CRA does so 
for a purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the ITA.”42 
In view of the broad nature of the exception and the possibility for 
significant collateral consequences, the Court held that the accounting 
records exception found in section 232(1)’s definition of solicitor-client 
privilege infringed section 8 of the Charter.43 With respect to section 1, the 
Court acknowledged that the ITA has a pressing and substantive objective, 
“namely, the collection of taxes”, but found that the three provisions could 
not be saved under section 1 because they were not minimally impairing for 
the reasons provided in the Court’s section 8 analysis.44 In terms of remedy, 
the Court ordered that the statutory provisions be read down to exclude 
notaries and lawyers from their scope of operation and invalidated the 
exception for a lawyer’s accounting records set out in the definition of 
“solicitor-client privilege.”45 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s analysis in this case does not mark a radical departure from 
its previous jurisprudence on solicitor-client privilege. The bottom line 
remains the same: the Court views solicitor-client privilege as very 
important and will protect it. Notwithstanding this continuity, the means 
used to defend solicitor-client privilege in Chambres des notaires are worth 
considering more closely. As in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation 
of Law Societies of Canada,46 the Court here relies on Charter rights 
typically used to protect individuals from excessive or otherwise 
inappropriate government interferences to insulate the lawyer-client 
relationship from government intrusions. The result is an awkward fit.  
In Federation of Law Societies of Canada, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of provisions in the Federal Government’s anti-money 
laundering and terrorist financing legislation which sought to: (1) impose 
                                                                                                                       
41 Id., at paras. 77-87. 
42 Id., at paras. 86-87. 
43 Id., at para. 78. 
44 Id., at paras. 88-91. 
45 Id., at paras. 92-95. 
46 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra, note 2. 
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on lawyers new obligations to collect and keep information about their 
clients; and (2) expose lawyers to the possibility of warrantless searches 
of their offices by government officials. The Court found that the 
provisions breached sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. In the Federation of 
Law Societies case, the Court’s section 8 analysis largely rested on the 
failure of the regime to prevent the “significant risk that at least some 
privileged material will be found among the documents that are the 
subject of the search powers in the Act” because the searches were 
warrantless and there was no requirement that documents be sealed 
before being examined or removed from the lawyer’s office.47 The 
Court’s section 7 analysis identified and applied a new principle of 
fundamental justice: “commitment to a client’s cause”.48 In finding a 
section 7 violation, the Court contended that the regime’s requirement 
that lawyers collect and retain information about their clients that was 
unnecessary for “ethical and effective representation” and with respect to 
which there were insufficient protections for solicitor-client privilege 
would unacceptably “reduce [client] confidence …in the lawyer’s ability 
to provide committed representation.”49 The themes of risk management 
and client trust that appear in Federation of Law Societies result in 
muddled constitutional analysis.50 A similar fate befalls the Court in 
Chambre des notaires. 
Drawing on its previous jurisprudence on law office searches, the 
Court in both cases stipulates that the government needs to provide 
stringent safeguards to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
information when it seeks to obtain documents or information from 
lawyers’ offices. In Chambres des Notaires, the Court also stresses the 
need for the Government to exhaust all other possible alternatives before 
it seizes material from a lawyer’s office: 
[W]e find that the entire requirement scheme is flawed in that it 
authorizes a seizure that cannot be characterized as a measure of last 
resort. In the context of a seizure involving information or documents 
that may be protected by the professional secrecy of notaries or 
lawyers, this presents a problem. 
                                                                                                                       
47 Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 42. In its s. 8 analysis, the Court drew 
heavily on its previous jurisprudence on law firm office searches, namely: Lavallee, Rackel & 
Heintz, supra, note 6. 
48 Federation of Law Societies, id., at paras. 74-111. 
49 Id., at paras. 108 and 109. 
50 Salyzyn, “A False Start”, supra, note 8. 
184 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
We agree that the problem in this case is not as acute as in Lavallee or 
FLS, which involved physical searches of law offices. The mere service 
of a requirement to disclose certain information or documents is not on 
the same scale. Nevertheless, we find that it is not absolutely necessary 
here to rely on notaries or lawyers rather than on alternative sources in 
order to obtain the information or documents being sought. For example, 
where the Minister seeks information about specific transactions in which 
the client took part, the information would be available from alternative 
sources, such as financial institutions, that do not have as onerous an 
obligation to safeguard its confidentiality. In this regard, there is no 
evidence that the Minister even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to obtain  
the information in question by alternative means before issuing a 
requirement to a legal adviser.51 
The high threshold established here aligns with the Court’s 
entrenched position that solicitor-client privilege must be vigorously 
protected. However, there is an incongruity in using this high threshold 
in a section 8 Charter analysis that is statutorily tethered to the concept 
of “reasonableness”. The conceptual means that the Court uses to get 
around this — simply deeming “any legislative provision that 
interferes with professional secrecy more than is absolutely necessary” 
to be “unreasonable” for the purposes of section 8 — seems 
analytically unsatisfactory. Allowing the Government to engage in all 
reasonable searches and seizures (as the plain wording of section 8 
directs) seems to be fundamentally different than setting up something 
close to “an absolute prohibition” on government searches and 
seizures by requiring that they be a “last resort” (as the Court wants to 
do in relation to privileged material). Moreover, whatever one thinks 
of the conceptual coherence of this analytical move, a significant 
practical consequence remains: in setting such a high standard, the 
Court arguably presents “solicitor-client privilege as a super-
constitutional right”, to borrow Adam Dodek’s term, which, as he 
notes, makes privilege “very difficult to limit” and risks generating  
“a constitutional straightjacket for the Court in future cases where  
it wants to recognize a limit on this right.”52 And, of course, any  
                                                                                                                       
51 Id., at paras. 58-59. 
52 A.M. Dodek, “Constitutional Hierarchy: Solicitor-Client Privilege as a Super-Constitutional 
Right” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar Association Constitutional Law Conference, Toronto, October 19, 
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“super-constitutional” status sits uneasily with the Court’s repeated 
rejections of a “hierarchy of [Charter] rights.”53  
In both Federation of Law Societies and Chambres des notaires, the Court 
resolves this challenge by falling back on the question of appropriate risk 
management. Notwithstanding the language of “last resort” and “absolute 
necessity” used, the Court clearly states in both cases that the Government 
could design a regime that would allow for law office search and seizures so 
long as it sufficiently reduces the risk for inadvertent disclosures of materials 
protected by solicitor-client privilege. In adding this qualification to the 
analysis, the Court appears to be subtly replacing necessity as the key 
yardstick with a test centred on sufficient risk reduction. For example, with 
respect to the ITA’s idiosyncratic definition of privilege, the Court in 
Chambres des notaires suggests that taking care to craft a more precise 
exemption that would allow tax authorities to obtain only those accounting 
records that they need could make this section constitutionally compliant.54  
The guidance that the Court offers on risk management is curious. 
Although, as noted above, the Court lists four ways in which the ITA 
requirement procedure is constitutionally defective, it suggests that the 
failure to provide client notice is the most significant: 
If the client were given notice of the requirement and afforded an 
opportunity to independently safeguard his or her right to professional 
secrecy before the information was disclosed, the fact that the 
requirement is not sent as a last resort would not be fatal to the scheme. 
The risk of information protected by professional secrecy being 
revealed would then be minimized by the fact that the client would 
have an opportunity to challenge its disclosure.55 
                                                                                                                       
53 See, for example, Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 
15, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, 2005 SCC 15, at para. 26 (S.C.C.) and Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79, at para. 50 (S.C.C.). 
54 This sentiment is reflected, for example, in Chambres des Notaires, supra, note 1, at para. 84: 
The potential scope of the expression ‘accounting record of a lawyer’ is therefore problematic 
from the standpoint of the absolute necessity test. The exception set out in the definition of 
‘solicitor‑client privilege’ in s. 232(1) of the ITA does not distinguish the many forms that 
information in an accounting record can take. For now, all information in an accounting 
record is to be disclosed in response to a requirement regardless of the form or the content of 
the record. The information may therefore have nothing to do with the Minister’s power of 
audit and collection, and the Minister may not need it in order to achieve his or her objective 
under the ITA. In fact, nothing in the arguments of the AGC and the CRA suggests why, to 
achieve the purposes of the ITA, it would be absolutely necessary to set aside professional 
secrecy for such a wide range of documents rather than, for example, doing so only in respect 
of the amounts paid and owed by clients. 
55 Id., at para. 61. 
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The proposal to add a client notice requirement provides Parliament 
with a clear and seemingly easy way to Charter-proof amended 
legislation in this area (provided that issues do not remain with the 
definition of solicitor-client privilege in the legislation). As a practical 
question of effective risk management, however, the premise that client 
notice would provide a robust safeguard against undesirable disclosure of 
privileged material is empirically dubious.  
On one level, the Court’s claim that “if the client is given notice of the 
requirement, the risk of privileged information being disclosed without 
his or her consent … would be greatly reduced” is self-evidently true.56 If 
a client is notified, it would seem more likely that the client and the 
lawyer would discuss the requirement, either because the client himself 
or herself contacts the lawyer or the lawyer, seeing that the client is 
copied, proactively reaches out to explain the requirement. Practically 
speaking, however, there is a real question as to whether, in many cases, 
the decision-making process would be substantially different when a 
client is copied on a requirement.  
The Court contends that, when a client is not copied, there are 
“many reasons” why a legal professional might not adequately protect 
a client’s right to keep privileged material confidential, including an 
honest but mistaken belief that the materials are not privileged, a self-
regarding concern about being prosecuted for a failure to disclose or 
simply forgetting to verify whether any of the requested material is 
protected by privilege.57 On reflection, these types of risks are unlikely 
to be substantially mitigated by client notice in many cases. The 
question of which client materials are privileged can be legally 
complex. If a client is faced with a lawyer who either mistakenly or 
self-interestedly tells him or her that the requested documents should 
be disclosed, the client is apt to defer to his or her lawyer, who, of 
course, the client is paying to be an expert on the law. Given the 
importance of solicitor-client privilege, consent in this context must be 
robustly informed. Where a client is merely deferring to his or her 
lawyer as an expert on the law of privilege, a client may be consenting, 
but only in the most superficial sense. In practical terms, providing 
client notice may do very little to better facilitate the client’s ability to 
meaningfully enforce his or her right to prevent privileged materials 
from being disclosed to tax authorities. 
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To be sure, even if client notice would not materially change the risk 
of disclosure of privileged material, one can imagine the argument that 
any remaining risk is not “unreasonable” for the purposes of a section 8 
analysis in light of the fact that, to use the Government’s words, the 
“Canadian tax system is based on the principle of self-reporting and self-
assessment, which means that the tax authorities must rely on broad 
powers of audit to ensure the system’s integrity.”58 At this point, 
however, we loop back to the problem of incongruity between the 
Court’s strong rhetoric about solicitor-client privilege and the 
reasonableness analysis under section 8. The level of risk that would 
remain with an added client notice requirement is hard to square with the 
Court’s pronouncement that “any legislative provision that interferes 
with professional secrecy more than is absolutely necessary will be 
labelled unreasonable”.59  
This is particularly true given the Court’s explicit refusal to mandate 
judicial pre-authorization for ITA seizures from lawyers’ offices or even 
the much less onerous step of first requesting documents from other 
possible sources, like financial institutions. Regardless of one’s position 
on the ultimate merits of a more relaxed approach, everyone should be 
concerned with an inconsistent constitutional analysis that posits the 
most stringent possible test of “absolute necessity” but then measures 
government interferences against a much lower standard. If the Court is 
uncomfortable with the implications of the “constitutional straight-
jacket” it has created by constitutionalizing solicitor-client privilege it 
would be healthier to evaluate this doctrinal move at a first-principles 
level, rather than trying to Houdini out of this self-imposed constraint.60 
Additionally, the Court seems to have painted itself into a corner by 
suggesting, in its analysis of the ITA’s definition of solicitor-client 
privilege, that it might be constitutionally permissible to allow the 
Government to search and seize material that would otherwise be 
considered privileged, so long as the enabling legislation is sufficiently 
precise in exempting the material at issue and the search or seizure can 
be characterized as “absolutely necessary to achieve the purposes of the 
legislation.”61 Surely, precision and necessity cannot be the only 
applicable criteria? If solicitor-client privilege is, in fact, a rule with 
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“deep significance and a unique status in our legal system”;62 “a civil 
right of supreme importance in the Canadian justice system”;63 and “a 
principle of fundamental justice”,64 among other things, one would 
imagine that it takes more than precise legislative drafting and a close 
connection to legislative purpose (regardless of what that legislative 
purpose might be) in order to legislatively derogate from it. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence that has considered lawyer regulation in 
the context of section 7 of the Charter does not offer a useful alternative 
to consider the constitutionality of state interferences in the lawyer-client 
relationship. In this jurisprudence, the issue of client trust replaces risk 
management as the governing concept. In both Federation of Law 
Societies and Chambres des notaires, the Court expressed concern about 
lawyers’ offices being treated as “archives” for government authorities 
seeking information about clients.65 In the Federation of Law Societies 
case, the majority repeatedly emphasized in its section 7 analysis the 
need for clients to have confidence that their lawyers are operating with 
undivided loyalty and are providing “committed representation”.66 In 
support of its conclusion that the regime in that case violated section 7, 
the majority in the Federation of Law Societies case found: 
...The reasonable and well-informed client would see his or her lawyer 
being required by the state to collect and retain information that, in the 
view of the legal profession, is not required for effective and ethical 
representation and with respect to which there are inadequate 
protections for solicitor-client privilege. Clients would thus reasonably 
perceive that lawyers were, at least in part, acting on behalf of the state 
in collecting and retaining this information in circumstances in which 
privileged information might well be disclosed to the state without the 
client’s consent. This would reduce confidence to an unacceptable 
degree in the lawyer’s ability to provide committed representation.67 
The ITA’s requirement procedure gives rise to similar concerns and, 
thus, implicates the new principle of fundamental justice declared in the 
Federation of Law Societies case: the lawyer’s duty of commitment to a 
client’s cause. However, several commentators, including myself, have 
                                                                                                                       
62 Id., at para. 28. 
63 Id., at para. 5. 
64 Id., at paras. 28, 37. 
65 Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 75; and Chambres des Notaires, 
supra, note 1, at para. 60. 
66 Federation of Law Societies, id. 
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argued that the majority’s section 7 analysis in Federation of Law 
Societies and, in particular, its use of this new principle of fundamental 
justice is an awkward fit for the Court’s legitimate concerns about state 
interference in lawyers’ work.68 It is unfortunate that the Court did not 
take the opportunity in Chambres des notaires to try to resolve these 
issues or, in the alternative, acknowledge that there are intractable 
problems with using “commitment to a client’s cause” as a principle of 
fundamental justice. If the Government does amend the ITA requirement 
procedure to require client notice with a view to making it Charter 
compliant, a section 7 challenge may well be part of any subsequent case 
brought by legal regulators. It would have been helpful for the Court to 
provide at least some guidance as to what section 7 might require in 
these circumstances.  
V. CONCLUSION: INDEPENDENCE OF THE BAR AS A WAY OUT? 
By constitutionalizing solicitor-client privilege, the Court has 
powerfully reinforced the importance of this concept to the proper 
functioning of our legal system and has given itself a new tool to protect 
the lawyer-client relationship from state interference. But, now, with 
more than a decade of this constitutionalization behind us, it is becoming 
more and more apparent that individual Charter rights, such as sections 7 
and 8, are an awkward mechanism to insulate the lawyer-client 
relationship from government interference. 
The question of when the government can impose demands on the 
lawyer-client relationship for its own ends — whether it be preventing 
money laundering or collecting taxes — inextricably involves a 
consideration of what independence of the bar means and why it is 
important. At stake in cases like Chambres des notaires and 
Federation of Law Societies is the degree to which clients can access 
legal services unimpeded by inappropriate interference by the state. 
This access is the key interest protected by solicitor-client privilege. 
As stated by the Court: “The lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality is 
necessary to preserve the fundamental relationship of trust between 
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lawyers and clients.”69 Access to legal services is also the interest that 
the Court sought to protect in recognizing “commitment to a client’s 
cause” as a new principle of fundamental justice in Federation of Law 
Societies. There, the Court proclaimed: “...A client must be able to 
place ‘unrestricted and unbounded confidence’ in his or her lawyer; 
that confidence which is at the core of the solicitor-client relationship 
is a part of the legal system itself, not merely ancillary to it…. The 
lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s cause, along with the 
protection of the client’s confidences, is central to the lawyer’s role in 
the administration of justice.”70  
Once we recognize, as we must, that the state has some interest in 
what goes on in the lawyer-client relationship — no one argues, for 
example, that lawyers should be their clients’ “dupes” or criminal 
“accomplices” to use the language in the Federation of Law Societies 
case — it is necessary to articulate the boundary between appropriate and 
inappropriate government interference in the lawyer-client relationship.71 
To articulate this boundary, one needs a clear understanding of 
independence of the bar and why it is important. As Alice Woolley and 
others have explained, the Court’s jurisprudence lacks such an 
understanding.72 At the very least, the Court’s continued constitutional 
consideration of the limits of state interference in the lawyer-client 
relationship requires that independence of the bar be foregrounded and 
that a more sophisticated understanding of this concept be presented.  
The analytical problems raised in this article show no sign of 
disappearing any time soon. It has been suggested that the federal 
government is currently looking at ways to amend its anti-money 
laundering and terrorist financing regime to make it constitutionally 
compliant as it applies to lawyers.73 Lawyer regulators are apt, no doubt, to 
challenge any amended legislation. Moreover, given the Court’s signalling 
in Chambres des notaires that a minor change of providing client notice and 
a more precise definition of solicitor-client privilege could render the 
regime at issue constitutionally compliant in relation to legal professionals, 
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it seems possible that we might see new legislation in this area as well. The 
upshot of more refined legislation may be pressure on the Court to provide 
a more sophisticated analysis of how the Constitution protects the lawyer-
client relationship. Alternatively, the Court may simply retreat into more 
familiar doctrinal concepts, regardless of any resulting analytical muddle. 
Time will tell which route will be taken. 
  
 
